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SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION TODAY
DOUGLAS

G.

BAIRD*

Abstract: In large corporate reorganizations, bankruptcy judges often
confirm plans of reorganization that call for "substantive consolidation" of
the different corporate entities comprising the corporate group. Substantive consolidation allows the general creditors of the various entities to
share in a common pool of assets; it often simplifies a reorganization and
wins broad support among the creditors. Nevertheless, a statutory basis for
the doctrine is hard to find, and the lower court practice is often at odds
with the doctrine as spelled out in appellate court opinions. The emerging
debate over the proper scope of substantive consolidation shows how much
bankruptcy law remains a common-law discipline whose contours are shaped
in the courtroom as well as in Congress.
INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 is the most sweeping change in bankruptcy law in a quarter
century.1 Much of bankruptcy law, however, remains judge-made, and
here the area is in considerable flux. This Article focuses on the question of substantive consolidation, a bankruptcy-law analogue to veilpiercing, to show how judges can shape the legal landscape as much
2
as legislators.
Part I of this Article sets out the background through a hypothetical. Part H examines substantive consolidation as commonly
practiced in the bankruptcy courts. 3 Part III reviews the evolution of
the doctrine and shows how modern practice has lost its moorings

* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I
thank Donald Bernstein, Andrew Brinkman, Leslie Keros, Richard Levin, and Robert
Rasmussen for their help. I am also grateful to the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Russell Baker Scholars Fund for research support.
I See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
2 Many excellent overviews of substantive consolidation exist. See generally Mary Elisabeth Kors, AlteredEgos: DecipheringSubstantive Consolidation,59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 381 (1998).
3 See infra notes 6-49 and accompanying text.
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and is likely to be vulnerable if the U.S. Supreme Court confronts the
question.4
I. THE MECHANICS OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

A large business often consists of many corporate entities. When
the parent corporation declares bankruptcy, each entity typically files
its own Chapter 11 petition, and the cases are then administratively
consolidated. One judge presides over all the cases, and one set of
lawyers represents the various debtors. The separateness of the legal
entities is preserved, and the general creditors of each entity share the
entity's assets with the other general creditors of that entity. In a
number of complex reorganizations-WorldCom being a recent example-those running the reorganization want to take the next step
and substantively consolidate the various cases. Under substantive
consolidation, the liabilities and assets of the various entities are put
into the same pot, and the assets are distributed ratably among the
general creditors. Under this scheme, some general creditors fare better and others worse.
Enhancing the rights of some creditors at the expense of others
in this fashion requires justification. In some cases, the institutional
lenders have already treated the business as a single entity. For them,
unscrambling the many intercorporate relationships introduces complexities to the reorganization without corresponding benefits. Figuring out the exact pro rata share does not make sense, especially if virtually all the players have already agreed on a plan of reorganization.
The following hypothetical reflects a common pattern. Premium
Paint is one of the largest manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of
paint and paint-related merchandise in the Midwest. 5 It consists of six
separate corporations. Premium Paint Co., Inc., is a publicly traded
Delaware corporation that serves as a holding company for its subsidiaries. RetailCo operates most of the retail paint and paint-related
stores; NewRetailCo operates the balance. Several years ago, Premium
acquired NewRetailCo from a competitor and assumed all of its debt,
including long-term unsecured notes. Aside from intercorporate obligations (of which there are many), NewRetailCo is in the best
financial shape of any of the subsidiaries. ManufacturerCo manufacSee infra notes 50-81 and accompanying text.
These facts are loosely based on In re Standard Brands PaintCo., 154 B.R. 563, 564-65
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993), and to a lesser extent, on Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R.S. Dickson &
Co. (In reFloraMir Candy Cop.), 432 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1970).
4
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tures paint and paint-related items. DistributorCo is the distribution
subsidiary for paint manufactured by ManufacturerCo. RealtyCo owns
or manages real estate holdings, including those where RetailCo and
NewRetailCo operate the retail paint stores.
The six corporations operate together as a functional whole.
Separate books and records are kept for internal purposes, but the
debtors report to the SEC on a consolidated basis. The institutional
creditors that lend to any entity typically secure cross-guarantees from
the others. Cash from each Premium Paint entity is swept every day
into one common account. Intercompany accounts are kept, but no
cash changes hands and no accounts are ever closed out. Assets such
as computer software are shared, as is office space. Employees of the
different entities work together in planning new products and advertising campaigns. Overhead costs are divided among the different entities according to a formula fixed long ago.
In fine print, invoices indicate the separate corporate status of
the different entities, but other communications are less clear. All the
entities use the Premium Paint logo on their stationery, advertising,
and press releases. They usually also include their own names. For
example, RetailCo's letterhead reads, beneath the Premium Paint
logo, "RetailCo, a member of the Premium Paint Group." DistributorCo's letterhead reads, beneath the same logo, "DistributorCo, a
division of Premium Paint." "Divisions" at Premium Paint, however, do
not always correspond with discrete legal entities. ManufacturerCo is
divided into several product lines (such as Premium Outdoor and
Premium Metallic), and occasionally these have identified themselves
as "divisions" of Premium Paint, even though they are part of ManufacturerCo and not separate legal entities.
The board of directors of each subsidiary consists entirely of
officers of the parent. The debtors, however, have always paid meticulous attention to corporate formalities, such as holding meetings and
keeping minutes. Institutional lenders know they are dealing with different legal entities, as do the largest trade vendors. There is disclosure of the corporate structure in an exhibit to Premium Paint's 10-K
and some discussion of some of the entities in the body of the 10-K
and footnotes to the company's financial statements. Nevertheless,
most trade vendors and the public at large are not aware of the distinctions among individual members of the group. On-the-ground
employees are not always completely aware of the different entities
either. They sometimes blur the lines in accounting for costs and recording intercompany transactions.
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Premium Paint files for Chapter 11, and the plan that emerges
consolidates the claims against all the entities. Substantive consolidation avoids the complications that arise from sorting out both the
many intercorporate balances and the rights that different creditors
have against the various entities. The competing groups of creditors
may reach agreement with one another, and the court may then approve what is, for practical purposes, a consensual plan.
But what happens if the negotiations fail? Can Premium Paint's
plan be confirmed over the objection of the creditors? As with many
other aspects of modern Chapter 11 practice, the debtor's ability to
confirm such a plan is not clear. Those most likely to raise objections
to the Premium Paint plan are the noteholders of NewRetailCo. They
lent to NewRetailCo before it became part of the Premium Paint
group. Existing practice in the bankruptcy courts suggests that substantive consolidation in a case such as Premium Paint might be appropriate, but, as we shall see, there is good reason to be skeptical.
II.

THE "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

Someone wanting to argue in favor of substantive consolidation
for Premium Paint might begin by invoking Drabkin v. Midland-Ross
Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.).6 As read by other courts, Auto-Train requires a three-part inquiry. 7 First, those proposing substantive consolidation have to show "a substantial identity between the entities to
be consolidated." 8 The presence of consolidated financial statements
and a seamless interaction among the various entities, such as what we
see with Premium Paint, may be sufficient to make such a showing.9
Second, proponents need to show that "consolidation is necessary to
avoid some harm or to realize some benefit." 0 Here, the difficulty of
sorting out Premium Paint's many intercorporate transactions and
the need to protect the vast majority of creditors who thought they
were dealing with a single business might well satisfy this test. 1

6 See 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
7 Auto-Train discusses substantive consolidation only in dictum and purports to follow
the cases in the Second Circuit. Nevertheless, other courts have managed to tease out of it
a test for substantive consolidation that is distinctly different from that of the Second Circuit and is far less demanding.
8
Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
9 SeeSovierov. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1964).
10Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
1 See First Nat'l Bank of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796, 799 (8th Cir.
1992); Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n, 935 F.2d 245, 250 (11th Cir. 1991); In reWorld-
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At this point, the burden shifts to the opponent of consolidation
to show that "it relied on the separate credit of one of the entities and
that it will be prejudiced by the consolidation."12 Under our facts, only
the noteholders of NewRetailCo can argue that they relied on the
separate form of NewRetailCo. So long as these creditors consent to
the plan, there may be no one to rebut the presumption of consolidation. Even if a few of these noteholders do dissent, they may not be
able to show that the harm to them outweighs the benefits that everyone else enjoys from the consolidation.
The dissenting noteholders of NewRetailCo may have to contend
with two additional issues as well. First, if the premerger noteholders
of NewRetailCo approve, as a class, the proposed substantive consolidation plan, an unhappy individual noteholder holding a claim within
that class may be out of luck. This is true because the typical case today does not involve substantive consolidation in the traditional sense.
The entities retain their separate identities after the reorganization.
(Indeed, the failure to do this will trigger tax liabilities.) Substantive
consolidation is done for distributional purposes only, whereby the
proposed plan pays out different claims as if the entities were consolidated, but the entities are not actually consolidated. As such, if the
other members of the class accept their distributions under the plan,
the dissenter can insist only on receiving what it would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation, which may have been little or nothing. 13
A second issue that dissenting noteholders may face is the
difficulty of showing that substantive consolidation prejudices them,
given that complex intercorporate liabilities are present. This issue
exists even if the dissenting noteholders as a class reject the plan.
Suppose NewRetailCo has assets of $100 and its only creditors, the old
NewRetailCo noteholders, are owed $100. They would be paid in full
if each corporate entity were treated separately. But let us assume that
after consolidation, the NewRetailCo noteholders and all the other
creditors receive only forty cents on the dollar. Absent intercorporate
liabilities, the noteholders are worse off than they would have been
without consolidation.
Intercorporate liabilities, however, cloud the issue considerably.
NewRetailCo owes money to ManufacturerCo, RealtyCo, and DistribuCom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *16, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Oct. 21,

2003).
12Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
13 This is the effect of the "best interests of the creditors" test embedded in 11 U.S.C.

§ 1129(a) (7) (2000).
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torCo for paint purchases, rent, and advertising and other expenses.
There are objections to the formula used to apportion overhead.
Workers paid by other divisions may have worked for NewRetailCo. If
NewRetailCo and the other entities enter into a comprehensive settlement of intercorporate obligations in which NewRetailCo has net
obligations of $60 or more, the dissenting creditors will be unable to
show that substantive consolidation prejudices them. If they cannot
show prejudice, they have not met the burden that the third prong of
the Auto-Train test places on them. 14
The Auto-Train test has morphed into long laundry lists.' 5 This
array of tests and factors, however, suggests that substantive consolidation is plausible in a case such as Premium Paint, where everything,
including cash, is centrally managed and controlled and where the
different legal entities function as a unit, rather than as a mere collection of discrete businesses under one corporate umbrella. We have
substantial identity, benefits from consolidation, and relatively few
who can show reliance on corporate separateness. The harm that the
creditors suffer from the plan may be modest relative to the benefits
of a fast and efficient reorganization, especially if intercorporate
transfers make uncertain creditors' payout under a stand-alone plan.
The WorldCom reorganization showed how the pressures to ensure a speedy reorganization can be overwhelming.' 6 As in our hypothetical, the WorldCom plan proposed substantive consolidation for
distributional purposes only. 17 The reorganization did not affect the
legal and organizational structure of the various WorldCom entities
themselves for tax or any other purposes. 18 Again, as in the hypothetical, a group of noteholders stood in a position analogous to the noteF.2d at 276.
See, e.g., Giller, 962 F.2d at 799 (three-factor test); EastgroupProps., 935 F.2d at 249-50
(two-part test in which court can incorporate In re Vecco Construction or Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet factors); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085,
1093 (1st Cir. 1983) (five nonexclusive factors); In re Vecco Constr., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (a seven-factor test). The Third Circuit summarized the state of the law of substantive consolidation obliquely in Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, 347 F.3d 72, 86 n.7 (3d Cir.
2003), when it asked whether a business consisting of a number of different legal entities
should be treated as one for purposes of Title VII, which applies only if a firm employs a
minimum number of workers. Id. at 85-86.
16See In re WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *37.
17 Id. at *6.
8
1 See Debtors' Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code at
46 (filed May 23, 2003), In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG), 2003 WL 23861928
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.elaw4enron.com/WorldcomDisclo
sure.htm.
14 Auto-Train, 810
15
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holders of NewRetailCo: they had lent to MCI before WorldCom acquired it.19 Hence, these creditors could easily show that they had not
dealt with WorldCom as a single entity. The plan of reorganization as
originally proposed, however, would pay some of them nothing-even
though creditors of a parent, who were structurally junior to them,
20
would enjoy substantial distributions.
The court allowed substantive consolidation in an unpublished
opinion. 21 Two factors proved decisive. First, as often happens in
bankruptcy practice, the major parties reached a deal with one another.2 2 The court did not face the concerted opposition among the
parties that would have led, among other things, to a strongly contested appeal of the decision. Second, and much more importantly,
both the size and number of intercorporate transfers were staggering.23 In a single month, for example, more than 600,000 transactions

took place. 24 Millions of transactions flowed through intercompany
accounts, and these totaled one trilliondollars. 25
Although the court allowed substantive consolidation in this case,
one can doubt whether the decision was as cut and dried as the court
made it seem. The WorldCom court was located in the Second Circuit
and thus had to apply the test that the Second Circuit set out in 1988
in Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Company, Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.).26 In Augie/Restivo, the Second Circuit held that
substantive consolidation was appropriate only when (1) the creditors
had dealt with the entities as single economic units and had not relied
on their separate identities or (2) the debtors' affairs were so entangled that consolidation would benefit all creditors.2 7
The first circumstance serves as the bankruptcy analogue for
piercing the corporate veil.28 The two doctrines are not quite the

19In reWorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *5.
20

Id.

21 Id.

at *37.
at *16.
23 Id. at *11.
24 In re WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *11.
25 Id.
26 Id. at *35 (citing Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1988)). The Ninth Circuit also follows the
Augie/Restivo test. See Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 766 (9th Cir.
22 Id.

2000).
27 860

F.2d at 518.
For example, the cases of an individual and a corporation were substantively consolidated in Alexander, 229 F.3d at 758, 766. Substantive consolidation may be appropriate
28
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same. Veil-piercing allows the creditors of a subsidiary to reach the
assets of the parent, but does not at the same time allow creditors of
the parent to reach the assets of the subsidiary.2 9 In contrast, substantive consolidation puts all the assets in a common pool, and creditors
of the various entities share in it pro rata. 30 Nevertheless, both doctrines apply when the debtor has disregarded separateness so
significantly that creditors treated the different corporations as one
legal entity. 3 1 The idea is that the affairs of the two corporations are so
closely entwined that each lacks a separate existence for all practical
purposes. In the WorldCom case, however, the reliance of the MCI
noteholders on MCI as a separate entity made it hard to justify sub32
stantive consolidation on these grounds.
It was more plausible in WorldCom to rely on the second prong of
Augie/Restivo. 33 This prong recognizes that keeping the corporations'
affairs separate must be practical. We need to look at the costs of sorting out the affairs of two related corporations if they are treated as
one entity versus if they are treated as two. 34 Even though the corporations are sufficiently separate such that we would not pierce the corporate veil outside of bankruptcy, their affairs may have become so
entangled and their assets so meager that unscrambling the mess may
not be worth the cost.35 When the administrative costs of sorting out

the obligations of the two corporations dwarf the benefits that any
group of creditors might reap from keeping the corporations separate, it is in everyone's interest to consolidate the two. 36 But the

WorldCom plan wiped out some creditors entirely, whereas they might
have received something once the accounts were sorted out. Even if
the accounts could never be completely reconciled, one might still be
between other kinds of entities as well, such as between partners and partnerships or even
between two individuals. See FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1992).
2 See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 2005).
30

See, e.g., id.

31 See id. at 205-06.
32 The court, however, concluded otherwise. See In re WorldCon, 2003 WL 23861928, at

*37 (finding the first prong of Augie/Restivo was satisfied because "a substantial portion of
creditors dealt with the Debtors as a single economic unit and did not rely on the separate
identity of any particular Debtor entity in extending credit").
33 See id. ("The facts amply demonstrate that the Debtors' operational and financial affairs are so entangled that the accurate identification and allocation of assets and liabilities
either could never be accomplished, or, even if it could be accomplished, would take so
long and be so costly such that creditors as a whole would be substantially harmed by the
effort. Thus, disentangling the financial affairs of the Debtors is a practical impossibility.").
3 See Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 519.
35 See id.
36 See id; see also In reThe Leslie Fay Cos., 207 B.R. 764, 779-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1997).
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able to find that enough assets remained in the relevant entity for the
creditors to receive something.
When the bankruptcy court-and everyone else-wants to
confirm a plan and enable a business to exit rapidly from Chapter 11,
there is a natural tendency to find that substantive consolidation is
possible under whatever test is supposed to apply. Bankruptcy judges
enjoy considerable discretion, and they are often willing to allow practical considerations to trump legal principle. Some courts of appeals,
however, resist any interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that is
made chiefly to accommodate pragmatic concerns. 37 This reluctance
is illustrated most vividly in the Third Circuit's recent decision in In re
38

Owens Corning.
In In re Owens Corning, the district court had confronted a set of
facts even weaker than those seen in the Premium Paint example yet
allowed substantive consolidation under a variation of the Auto-Train
test. 39 The court held that two circumstances together created a prima
facie case for consolidation: (1) a central committee exercised common control over the operations and finance of the subsidiaries, and
(2) the subsidiaries were created for the convenience of the parent,
primarily for tax reasons. 40 The remaining question under the AutoTrain test was whether creditors relied on the separateness of the entities. 41 Here, the court found that the failure to track the finances of
the individual subsidiaries was fatal:
There can be no doubt that the Banks relied upon the
overall credit of the entire Owens Corning enterprise. Each
Bank's commitment was to the entire enterprise. The decision
as to whether funds would be borrowed by the parent company, or by one or more of the subsidiaries, was made by the
borrowers, not by the lenders. All of Owens Corning's

37

Judge Easterbrook's opinion in In re Kmart, rejecting the doctrine of necessity, is a
typical example. See 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir.) (calling the doctrine of necessity "just a
fancy name for a power to depart from the Code"), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 495 (2004). Many
courts embrace literal interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v.
Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 266-70 (4th Cir. 2004) (insisting on
literal interpretation of rules governing assumption of executory contracts); Perlman v.
Catapult Entm't, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm't, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1999)
(same).
m See In re Owens Corning,419 F.3d at 207-12.
39
In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168, 169-70, 171, 172 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
40 Id. at 171.
41 Id.
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financial reporting was done on a consolidated basis, and only
that consolidated information was provided to the Banks.
It is also important to note that, in seeking and obtaining
guarantees from the 'substantial' subsidiaries, the Banks knew
only that each guarantor had assets with a book value of $30
million or more; the Banks had no information about the
debts of such subsidiaries.
In short, there is simply no basis for a finding that, in extending credit, the Banks relied upon the separate credit of
42
any of the subsidiary guarantors.
It was not sufficient that the banks counted on the corporate separateness to ensure their own priority position. As is often the case
when applying the Auto-Train test, the burden of showing substantial
identity is relatively light, and the burden of showing reliance on the
43
part of the creditor resisting substantive consolidation is heavy.

The Third Circuit flatly rejected this approach, holding that substantive consolidation was possible only under "compelling circumstances." 44 It focused squarely on the principles set out in Augie/Restivo
and required proponents of substantive consolidation to show either:
"(i) [P]repetition [the different debtors] disregarded separateness so
significantly [that] their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity
borders and treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) [P]ostpetition
their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that separating them is
prohibitive and hurts all creditors." 45
Applying this test to the facts, the case was easy. Indeed, the court
questioned whether there could ever be a "deemed" substantive consolidation such as in WorldCom. The entities could not be both so entangled as to justify consolidation and yet so distinct that it was possible and desirable to keep them separate after bankruptcy. 46
Quite apart from which test was being used, however, the outcome in In re Owens Corning was almost foreordained. The district
court decision had broken too much china. Substantive consolidation
in such a case would have effectively undermined bank loans, totaling
$2 billion, which had been made in a conventional and commercially

42 Id. at

172.

e.g., EastgroupProps., 935 F.2d at 251-52.
" In re Owens Corning,419 F.3d at 210-11.
45Id. at 211.
46Id. at 214-15.
43 See,
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reasonable way.47 Allowing substantive consolidation would have un48
settled too many established practices.
Still left undecided are the burdens on the proponents of substantive consolidation in going forward, in the Third Circuit and elsewhere,
when the affected lenders are not as careful and attention to corporate
form is more casual. In reaching its decision in In re Owens Corning,the
Third Circuit took pains to affirm the existence of the substantive consolidation doctrine and the power of bankruptcy courts to order substantive consolidation under appropriate circumstances. 49 The foundations of the doctrine itself, however, are less solid than even the Third
Circuit made them out to be. One cannot be confident that other
courts of appeals will likewise affirm the existence or the legitimacy of
the doctrine.
III.

THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

Substantive consolidation lacks the solid foundation one usually
expects of doctrines so firmly embedded in day-to-day practice. The
U.S. Supreme Court has never formally embraced the concept. Justice
William 0. Douglas came closest to doing so in 1941 in Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., but that case involved a recovery of assets
that had been fraudulently conveyed from one corporate entity to another.5 0 Moreover, the objecting creditor "had at least some knowledge as to the fraudulent character of [the] corporation." 51 As late as
1964, one could still argue that substantive consolidation required a
52
fraudulent conveyance.
The first cases to develop substantive consolidation as a doctrine
separate from fraudulent conveyance law relied squarely on corporate
law and the power to pierce the corporate veil. 53 The first opinions
came out shortly after the 1938 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins,54 at a time when courts had not yet absorbed
Erie's full impact. If they had, courts might have rationalized the location of the doctrine in federal common law as part of their inherent
47 Id. at 216.
48

Id.

F.3d at 205-09.
50 313 U.S. 215, 219-220 (1941).
S Id. at 221.
52 See Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964).
53 See, e.g., Stone v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir.
1942); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
54 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49 419

HeinOnline -- 47 B.C. L. Rev. 15 2005-2006

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 47:5

power to flesh out the interstices of bankruptcy law with common-law
reasoning. As it was, however, they did not invoke any special power of
bankruptcy courts as courts of equity, but simply looked to nonbankruptcy law. As the Fourth Circuit stated in 1942 in Stone v. Eacho (In re
Tip Top Tailors, Inc.):
It is well settled that courts will not be blinded by corporate
forms nor permit them to be used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong or perpetrate fraud, but will look through
the forms and behind the corporate entities involved to deal
with the situation as justice may require. 55
In these cases, courts relied on common-law principles, not on a doctrine peculiar to bankruptcy or courts of equity:
'Although we know of no instance in which it has been done
in matters of receivership, we cannot see why ...

the law

does not impose upon a court the same duty in a receivership matter when, as here, the facts are substantial enough
to justify, indeed to compel, a finding that the five corporations were so identified with the parent corporation as to be
a part of it.'56
Even into the 1960s, substantive consolidation was merely a federal
common-law variation of basic corporate law principles:
It is difficult to imagine a better example of commingling
of assets and functions and of the flagrant disregard of corporate forms than as here demonstrated by the bankrupt.
One gains the distinct impression that the bankrupt held up
the veils of the fourteen collateral corporations primarily, if
not solely, for the benefit of the tax gatherer, but otherwise
completely disregarded them. Even Salome's could not have
57
been more diaphanous.
Substantive consolidation finally acquired a rationale rooted in
bankruptcy policy in Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel. In that
case, the Second Circuit relied not on the lack of separateness of the
legal entities but on the sheer cost of sorting out the various rights
and obligations:
55 127 F.2d at 288.
56

r7

Id. at 289 (quoting Tr. Sys. Co. of Pa. v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 1933)).
Soviero, 328 F.2d at 448.
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[W]here the interrelationships of the group are hopelessly
obscured and the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them so substantial as to threaten the
realization of any net assets for all the creditors, equity is not
helpless to reach a rough approximation of justice to some
8
rather than deny any to allY

This rationale was at the center of the typical cases decided by bankruptcy judges in the 1970s. In In re CommercialEnvelope Manufacturing
Co., unscrambling the various transactions might well have proved
impossible for the bankruptcy court:
Many of the day to day operations have occurred as though
the debtors were one consolidated and integrated entity.
The effusion of time and money would be almost prohibitive
were any sophisticated effort to make sense out of the complex of cross lines undertaken.... [D]ue to the immense internal confusion, even if the expense of an audit were undertaken, there could be no assurance that it would be
successful in unscrambling the relationships.59
But even with this additional rationale, the Second Circuit permitted
substantive consolidation only in the rarest of circumstances. For instance, FloraMir Candy Corp. v. R S.Dickson & Co. (In re Flora Mir Candy
Corp.) involved multiple subsidiaries and "a multitude of intercompany
transactions, many without apparent business purpose." 60 The court
adopted the district court's finding that this state of affairs, standing
alone, was "grossly insufficient" to allow substantive consolidation, especially because the objecting creditor, like the noteholders of NewRetailCo in our example, entered the picture before the debtor joined the
61
corporate group.
A court that follows the doctrine as developed in the Second Circuit is unlikely to allow substantive consolidation in cases such as
Premium Paint. Common control, consolidated financials, and modern cash management are not enough to justify substantive consolidation grounded in veil-piercing and alter-ego actions, especially where
corporate formalities have been followed and the separate entities will
be maintained going forward. The cost-saving rationale of substantive
58 Chem. Bank. N.Y Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
59 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP) 647, 650 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Aug. 22, 1977).
60 432 F.2d 1060, 1061 (2d Cir. 1970).
61 Id. at 1062.
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consolidation is similarly unlikely to be available. To have an impact,
these costs must threaten to leave every creditorworse off. 62 Untangling
obligations among different corporate entities may be expensive, but
it will rarely come close to consuming so much of the estate as to
undo the structural priority some creditors enjoy over others when
corporate form is respected. The trillion-dollar mess in WorldCom is
exceptional, and even there the court might have been able to do
more than simply throw up its hands. As the court noted in In re
Owens Corning,perfection is not required, and some inaccuracies can
63
be tolerated.
In many substantive consolidation disputes, the creditors' reliance on corporate separateness seems a critical issue. Both Flora Mir
and Union Savings Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.)-cases in which the Second Circuit denied substantive
consolidation-involved creditors who could show that they dealt with
their respective debtors as distinct entities. 64 Moreover, Judge Ambro
of the Third Circuit couches his formulation of the test in In re Owens
Corningin terms of reliance. 65 The logic of substantive consolidation,
at least as developed in the Second Circuit, however, suggests such an
emphasis on reliance is not appropriate. Reliance is irrelevant to the
cost-saving prong of Augie/Restivo, and the other prong is satisfied
only when conditions are such that veil-piercing or alter-ego actions
could be brought outside of bankruptcy.66 These are available when
there is deliberate undercapitalization, misrepresentation, or failure
to follow corporate formalities. 67 Establishing these has little to do
with reliance.
62 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 & n.20 (3d Cir. 2005); Chem. Bank, 369
F.2d at 847.
63 See 419 F.3d at 214 ("Neither the impossibility of perfection in untangling the affairs
of the entities nor the likelihood of some inaccuracies in efforts to do so is sufficient to
justify consolidation."). In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on the analysis of the court in R2 Investments, LDC v. World Access, Inc. (In re World Access Inc.). See id. at
214-15. In R2 Investments, the court had stated that "perfection is not the standard in the
substantive consolidation context." R2 Invs., LDC v. World Access, Inc. (In re World Access
Inc.), 301 B.R. 217, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003).
64 Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In reAugie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860
F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988); In reFloraMir Candy Corp., 432 F.2d at 1062-63.
65 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 212. At the same time, however, he rejects suggestions that lenders must engage in elaborate gymnastics to prove actual reliance. See id. at
212-14.
66 See 860 F.2d at 518-19.
67 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An EmpiricalStudy, 76 CORNELL L.
Rxv. 1036, 1072 (1991).
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A debate over different approaches to substantive consolidation,
however, should not obscure a more fundamental problem. One cannot be sure that an appellate court would allow substantive consolidation at all, particularly given that the Supreme Court has never adopted
it. Far from providing a basis for substantive consolidation, cases such
as Sampsell rely explicitly on fraudulent conveyance doctrine and thus
6
underscore the need to find an explicit grant of power somewhere. 8
Section 1123(a)(5)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code may be a possible
source of support. 69 This section provides that "[n]otwithstanding any
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall ...provide ade-

quate means for the plan's implementation, such as... merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons. "70
This section provides a thin reed for justifying substantive consolidation, however. The language "notwithstanding any otherwise
applicable nonbankruptcy law" cannot sensibly be read as a broad
grant of power. It cannot, for example, give the debtor the ability to
merge itself with any third party it pleases, whether that party wants
the merger or not. Even if the provision contemplates "consolidation"
under Chapter 11 that could not have taken place elsewhere, nothing
suggests that such a consolidation can compromise the otherwise
valid claims of creditors of each entity. This section does not itself
grant a substantive right.
The absence of any clear statutory authority in the Bankruptcy
Code throws into question the viability of the doctrine in an appellate
court that focuses on the language of the Bankruptcy Code and refuses to look beyond it.71 Substantive consolidation is, as the term
suggests, a substantive power. In the view of some courts, substantive
powers such as this are permitted only to the extent that they grow
out of substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Courts have
stated again and again that substantive powers cannot be derived from
72
section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.

68 In permitting substantive consolidation, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Sampsel4 explicitly relied on the existence of a fraudulent conveyance. 313 U.S. at 220.
6 See In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. 532, 540-41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (citing Bankruptcy Code provision § 1123 (a) (5) (C) as permitting substantive consolidation).
7011 U.S.C. § 1123(a)-(a) (5) (C) (2000).
71 See J. Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive Consolidation,8
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 427, 432 (2000).
72To be sure, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) reads, in part, "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title."
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000). AsJudge Easterbrook notes, however, "[t]he power conferred
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There is still another reason to question the continued viability of
substantive consolidation. In the 1999 decision Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court found that,
in the absence of explicit congressional authorization, district courts
lack the power to issue preliminary injunctions to protect the rights of
general creditors. 73 The reasoning of Grupo Mexicano is broader than
its narrow holding and suggests that federal courts cannot create new
powers as courts of equity. Courts lack the power to "create remedies
previously unknown to equity jurisprudence." 74 Equitable powers are
limited to those that have a long history.75 New rules can "radically
.alter the balance between debtors' and creditors' rights which has
been developed over centuries through many laws-including those
relating to bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyances, and preferences." 76
The court in In re Owens Corning cited this language in rejecting
the idea that Grupo Mexicano is inconsistent with substantive consolidation. 77 By taking explicit note of bankruptcy rules that emerged over
time, the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexicano was apparently distinguishing them from the judicially created doctrine it struck down in that
case. 78 But the Supreme Court's endorsement of bankruptcy doctrines
that have developed over time does not extend to substantive consolidation. Unlike the law governing preferences and fraudulent conveyances, this doctrine did not develop over "centuries." Cases such as
Sampsell do not provide any additional support for substantive consolidation as a long-standing doctrine because they rely instead on fraudulent conveyance, veil-piercing, or other well-established doctrines. 79
Substantive consolidation emerged as a distinct power apart from veilpiercing and fraudulent conveyance actions only in the 1960s and
1970s. Indeed, the first use of the term "substantive consolidation" in a
reported opinion was not until 1975-the same year the remedy struck
down in Grupo Mexicano was first identified.8 0

by § 105(a) is one to implement rather than override." In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866,
871 (7th Cir. 2004).
73527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999).
74Id. at 332.
75See id. at 330-32; see also Tucker, supranote 71, at 440, 442-45.
76 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 331.
77In re Owens Coming, 419 F.3d at 208 n.14.
78 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 331.
79Id.; Sampsel 313 U.S. at 221.
80See Talcott Inc. v. Wharton (In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1004
n.3 (2d Cir.1975).
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Substantive consolidation doctrine lives in a peculiar netherworld. The more a substantive consolidation claim looks like a fraudulent conveyance claim, the more likely it is that the court will demand
the dispute be resolved on that basis. The more the power of substantive consolidation departs from traditional veil-piercing, the harder it
is to locate the power inside the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy
judge does have some discretion to fill the interstices, but, as Judge
Posner and others are quick to remind us, "[tihe fact that a [bankruptcy] proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views
of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be." 81
CONCLUSION

Given the uncertain future of substantive consolidation, the time is
ripe for a serious and thoughtful debate. The doctrine could evolve in
any of three or more radically different directions. A variant of the test
used in Auto-Train may continue to live in the bankruptcy courts, even
as the courts give lip service to In re Owens Corning and Augie/Restivo.
When a corporate group functions as a single whole, courts may be
quick to find "substantial identity." They may be easily persuaded that
creditors relied on the debtor as a single legal entity.82 Such reasoning

is hard to resist when, in cases such as WorldCon, confirmation will lead
to a quick exit from bankruptcy and the creditors overwhelmingly support the plan. For this reason, every prudent lender is well advised to
document reliance on corporate separateness as part of every extension of credit.
Alternatively, in the wake of In re Owens Corning, there may be a
revival of the Augie/Restivo test. Substantive consolidation may be allowed only under narrow and extraordinary circumstances. Courts
might permit it only when each debtor so lacks a separate identity that
the legal forms should no longer be recognized or when the different
debtors' affairs are so entangled and assets so meager that unscrambling the mess is not worth the cost. 83 One can also imagine approaches that combine elements of Auto-Train and Augie/Restivo or
that go in still different directions altogether.

81In rv Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986).
8 See, e.g., In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563, 573 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
83 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In reAugie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).

HeinOnline -- 47 B.C. L. Rev. 21 2005-2006

22

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 47:5

Finally, there is the possibility that a court could extend the reasoning in Grupo Mexicano or otherwise find that the doctrine does not
exist. They might decide that veil-piercing actions under nonbankruptcy law and the trustee's avoiding powers may be deemed
sufficient. For practitioners who have lived with the doctrine for decades and never doubted its existence, such a possibility seems remote.
But we have been surprised before.
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